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SELECTED OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY DECISIONS
Federal

Air Act: (1) switching from coal to natural gas and
(2) retrofitting old units with new pollution controls.
Authority achieved the goal of the TVAA, which is
to provide the least-cost energy system by
considering relevant data over a twenty-year
consumption period. The Court noted that although
retrofitting would cost less in the short-term, the
financial effect over the next two decades led
Authority to switch to natural gas. Authority fulfilled
NEPA standards by completing the preliminary
environmental assessment, concluding that the switch
would have no significant impact on the
environment. The Court deferred to Authority’s
discretion not to complete an environmental impact
statement.

Fourth Circuit
K & D Holdings, LLC v. Equitrans, L.P., 2015 WL
9461340, No. 15-1166 (4th Cir. 2015).
Lessor brought suit against both Lessee and Operator
alleging that Operator had not followed through with
the terms of the lease by failing to explore, produce,
and store gas. Lessor argued that due to Operator’s lack
of action in all unit areas, Lessor was entitled to a
“rebuttable presumption” under state law, which
provides that an operator has abandoned the lease if the
operator is inactive on the premises. Producer counter
argued that the “rebuttable presumption” statute at issue
did not apply because, under the terms of the lease,
Operator had to perform only one of the alternative acts
within the lease in order to maintain the entire lease.
Operator contended that the lease should continue
because Operator was protecting the underground gas
on the premises by storing it. The district court rejected
both arguments and acted, sua sponte, by finding that
the lease in question was divisible into separate tracts,
one tract continuing for exploration and production,
with a separate tract remaining for gas storage. The
lower court additionally held that after segmenting the
lease into two separate tracts, the exploration and
production tract had terminated after the primary term.
The Operator appealed the lower court’s decision. The
Fourth Circuit agreed with the Operator, and found that
under a fair construction of the lease terms, the lease
was not divisible. Thus, because the Operator was using
a portion of the land under the lease for protection of
gas storage, the Operator maintained all of the rights
under the lease.

Eighth Circuit
Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Moen, 808 F.3d 373 (8th
Cir. 2015).
Operator filed suit against Lessor seeking a
declaratory judgment on whether an oil and gas lease
executed between the parties was still in effect after
the expiration of the primary term. At the end of the
primary term, production existed in all parts of a
section except the Southwest quarter. Lessor
conceded that the lease was still in effect in the other
three quarter-sections but argued that the lease
expired as to the nonproducing Southwest quarter.
Conversely, Operator argued that the Pugh Clause
found within the terms of the lease caused the lease
to remain valid as to the entire section. The district
court focused its analysis on the definition of the
word “section” found within the lease’s Pugh Clause
and granted summary judgment in favor of Operator.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, holding that the Pugh Clause severed the
lease by the section boundaries. The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the appropriate definition of the word
“section” refers to the one-mile tract of land, such
that production found on any part of that one-mile
tract would extend the lease as to the entire section.

Sixth Circuit
Kentucky Coal Ass’n, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 804 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 2015).
Coal Association brought this action against Valley
Authority (Authority), pursuing a declaratory judgment
that Authority arbitrarily switched a power plant from
coal to natural-gas generation, thereby failing to comply
with the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (TVAA) and
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in
favor of Authority, giving deference to Authority’s
discernable
decision-making
process.
The
administrative record established that Authority
considered two alternatives to comply with the Clean

State
Louisiana
McCarthy

Evolution

Petroleum

Corp.

2015 WL 5972515, No. 2014–C–2607 (La. 2015).
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v.

Mineral Sellers (Sellers) filed suit against the Oil
Company (Company) that purchased their mineral
rights, alleging fraud and seeking a rescission of the
transaction. Sellers claimed that Company intentionally
targeted vulnerable and elderly mineral rights owners
who were not experienced in oil and gas practices.
Company did not reveal to the mineral rights holders
that it had an innovative carbon dioxide based
technology that greatly enhanced the amount of oil that
could be extracted, although it did release the
technological advancement via press release. The new
technology coupled with poor market conditions
resulted in Company being able to purchase more
mineral rights at lower prices. Sellers allege fraud by
silence in failing to reveal the new technology to
Sellers. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held for
Company and refused to nullify the transaction, citing
the speculative nature of drilling for both parties.

Oil company (Lessee) leased mineral acreage from a
landowner (Lessor). Lessee brought suit claiming
trespass against another Drilling Company and
sought to enjoin Drilling Company from drilling
through the Lessee’s leasehold estate to reach a
neighboring lease. While Drilling Company had
permission to drill from the Lessor, it did not have
permission from Lessee to cross its leasehold estate.
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the lower
court’s decision granting of summary judgment in
favor of Drilling Company. The Court of Appeals
determined control of the subsurface belonged to the
surface owner, as Lessee did not own or exclusively
control the subsurface. Although Lessee developed,
operated, and produced oil in the subsurface, Lessee
was not conveyed the ability to control the subsurface
to the extent of ejecting other drilling companies
from the mineral estate.

Indiana

Wyoming

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Southern
Indiana Gas and Elec. Co., 2015 WL 6550654, No.
93A02-1502-EX-110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. KD Co. LLC, 363 P.3d 18
(Wyo. 2015).
Energy Company (Company) obtained oil and gas
leases in Wyoming and subsequently entered into
contracts with the owners of the surface estate
(Landowners), which granted Company access to and
use of Landowners’ property to explore and extract
minerals. In the surface agreements, Company
committed to pay for surface damages and use of the
land, and to restore the land as close to its prior
condition as possible once drilling operations
concluded. Landowners sued for breach of the
surface agreements. The lower court granted
summary judgment in favor of Landowners,
concluding that Company remained liable under the
surface agreements even after assignment of the
mineral estate. The Supreme Court of Wyoming
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the
agreements between Company and Landowners did
not release Company from its obligations upon
assignment, the exculpatory clause in the lease was
not incorporated by reference into the surface
agreements, and Landowners were entitled to an
award of attorney fees pursuant to other agreements.

Utility Company filed a petition with the state’s Utility
Regulatory Commission (Commission) for approval to
modify their coal powered generating stations to meet
new EPA standards, requesting incentives and
reimbursement from ratepayers for costs associated
with the proposed modification. Action Coalition and
others intervened, opposing the petition and arguing
that retiring Utility Company’s coal powered generators
and replacing them with new natural gas-powered
generators would be more cost-effective. The
Commission approved the proposal and granted the
request for reimbursement. On appeal, Action Coalition
argued that the Commission failed to make necessary
findings of fact material to its determination of the
issues and statutory factors. Utility Company
responded, claiming that the appeal was moot and that
the Commission made all necessary findings. The
Indiana Court of Appeals held that the Commission did
err in failing to make findings on the factors listed in
the Indiana Code and remanded the case with
instructions.
Texas
Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC,
2015 WL 5964939, No. 04–14–00903–CV (Tex. App.
2015).
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SELECTED WIND AND WATER DECISIONS
State

setting of the fee—or its use of the resulting
proceeds—complied with SCVWDA.

Arizona
Colorado
Arizona Dept. of Water Resources v. McClennen, 238
Ariz. 371 (Ariz. 2015).

In Matter of Water Rights, 361 P.3d 392 (Colo.
2015).

Corporation applied to the Arizona Department of
Water Resources (ADWR), seeking to transfer its rights
to use surface water pursuant to a state statute. County,
believing that it was an “interested person” under the
state statute, sought to prevent this transfer. Despite
County’s objections, ADWR granted Corporation’s
transfer application. County appealed the decision to
the Superior Court. The Superior Court vacated
ADWR’s decision. Corporation then appealed to the
Supreme Court of Arizona. The Supreme Court of
Arizona vacated the Superior Court’s decision and held
that County was not an interested person because under
the state statute, an interested person is one who alleges
that they have an interest that is protected by the statute
that would be affected by the application for severance
and transfer. Based on the evidence before the Court,
County failed to meet the burden of proof that it was an
interested person.

Applicant filed an application to appropriate storm
runoff water. The application was denied by the
Ground Water Commission (Commission) due to the
fact that the water did not flow adjacent to a
continuous natural stream. The Commission
determined that the runoff was ground water and
therefore under its exclusive jurisdiction. Applicant
proceeded to file for a hearing on his application. The
lower court denied his application, finding that a
portion of the storm runoff was designated ground
water, which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Commission. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower
court’s decision because the water Applicant sought
to appropriate met the statutory definition of
designated ground water and was therefore subject to
the administration of the Commission. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the Appellate
Court’s ruling.

California
Maine
Great Oaks Water Company v. Santa Clara Valley
Water District, 242 Cal.App.4th 1187 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015).

Champlain Wind, LLC v. Board of Environmental
Protection, 2015 WL 7770652, No. 14-291 (Me.
2015).

Water District levied extraction fees on Water
Company for water drawn from wells on its property.
Water Company brought suit, claiming that the
extraction fees violated the Santa Clara Valley Water
District Act (SCVWDA). The lower court found in
favor of Water Company and awarded it a complete
refund of the extraction fees and, in the alternative, a
partial refund on grounds that the fees charged violated
the SCVWDA. The Appellate Court reversed the lower
court’s decision and held: (1) the fee is a propertyrelated charge for purposes of Article 13D, and thus, it
is subject to some of the constraints of that enactment;
(2) the fee is also a charge for water service, which is
exempt from the voter ratification requirement; (3) the
pre-suit claim submitted by Water Company did not
preserve any monetary damages against Water District
for the violations of Article 13D; and (4) because the
matter was treated as a simple action for damages when
it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of
mandate, the lower court failed to apply a deferential
standard of review in deciding whether Water District’s

Wind Developer submitted a proposal for a windfarm
within what is defined by state law as an “expedited
area.” According to the statutory language, the
process is streamlined for permitting approval from
the Board of Environmental Protection (Board)
within this area. The proposed windfarm was located
near the boarder of the expedited area and close to
nine large ponds determined to be “scenic resources
of state or national significance.” Under the same
legislation used for permitting, the Board is given the
power to deny proposals for projects that would
disrupt or harm scenic resources of the state. The
Board proceeded to deny Wind Developer’s
application and proposal. Wind Developer appealed
to the Supreme Court of Maine, arguing that the
Board does not have the right to aggregate the
environmental effect on all nine large ponds, and
becuase it found no significant effect on any
individual pond, the project should have been
approved as drafted. The Supreme Court of Maine
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affirmed the Board’s decision, citing that the law does
not specifically prohibit such aggregation and that the
Court may only overturn agency decisions it finds to be
unreasonable, unjust, or unlawful.

drives and recreational use, the Appellate Court
found that the 89-mile river study segment was not
navigable water and could not be deemed so for title
examination purposes.

Montana
Teton Co-Op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co.,
2015 WL 8923528, No. DA 15–0136 (Mont. 2015).
Reservoir Company appealed an order of a state water
court, which adjudicated Canal Company’s water rights
to the Eureka Reservoir. The issue the court addressed
on appeal was whether the water court erred in
determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka
Reservoir was included as part of Canal Company’s
notice of appropriation. The Appellate Court reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding
that the water court had misapprehended the effect of
the evidence that a sizable reservoir at the Eureka site
was part of a 1890 Notice. As the evidence established,
the 1890 Notice did not contemplate the Eureka
Reservoir, and Canal Company failed to prosecute the
Eureka Reservoir’s development with reasonable
diligence until the mid-1930s. The Appellate Court held
that since Canal Company’s claim cannot be staked to
the 1890 Notice or the nullified 1891 Notice, the water
court must determine Canal Company’s priority date
for the Eureka Reservoir on remand.
Oregon
Hardy v. State Land Bd., 360 P.3d 647 (Or. Ct. App.
2015).
State Agencies contended that an 89-mile segment
study of the Rogue River was declared navigable for
title purposes in 1975. Due to this declaration of
navigability, State Agencies further contended that the
State owned all right, title, and interest in and to the
lands located below the ordinary high water line along
the 89-mile river study segment, and it may only be
used by the public for certain uses. Landowner filed a
petition for judicial review under the relevant state
statute challenging State Agencies’ declaration of
ownership. In assessing State Agencies’ claim
regarding navigability, the lower court looked to the
usage of the river. On appeal, State Agencies argued
that the lower court erred in applying the actual use
theory rather than the susceptible use theory. The
Oregon Court of Appeals analyzed whether the upperportion of the river was susceptible to navigation in
1859. After considering several factors, such as log
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had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its
publication of the study, nor had it acted so when only
working to minimize environmental damage, not to
prevent it as the statutes require.

Sixth Circuit
Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 2015 WL
6646818, No. 14-6198 (6th Cir. 2015).

State

Property Owners brought a putative class action suit
against a whiskey distillery operator (Distiller),
alleging negligence, nuisance, and trespass, based on
Distiller’s ethanol emissions allegedly combining with
condensation on Property Owners’ property creating
fungus. The lower court denied Distiller’s motion to
dismiss, and Distiller’s filed an interlocutory appeal.
The Sixth Circuit held that the Clean Air Act (CAA)
does not preempt source state common law remedies
seeking to control air pollution even where the
defendant is in compliance with CAA requirements.
Further, even though Distiller’s federally enforceable
district origin operating permit did not set a cap for
fugitive ethanol emissions, environmental regulation
was a field that states had traditionally occupied, and
allowing states to apply their common law to
emissions advanced CAA’s stated purposed by
empowering states to address and curtail air pollution
at its source.

Florida
Rogers v. United States, 2015 WL 6749915, No.
SC14-1465 (Fla. 2015).
Owners of land abutting railroad parcels (Landowners)
filed suit against the United States in federal court,
alleging that the Government effected a taking of their
property by converting abandoned railroad right-ofways to a recreational trail, pursuant to an Act of
Congress. Landowners appealed from a judgment in
favor of the Government. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit submitted a certified
question to the Supreme Court of Florida as to whether
the railroad company’s interest in the property is
something less than fee simple absolute by virtue of
(1) Florida statutes, (2) state policy, and/or (3) the
factual considerations of this particular case. The
Supreme Court of Florida answered all three
components of the certified question in the negative,
validating the Government’s contention that the
railroad company could have, by unambiguous deed,
acquired ownership of the lands in fee simple. The
case was then remanded to the Court of Appeals.

Ninth Circuit
Desert Protective Council v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior,
2015 WL 7292969, No. 13-55561 (9th Cir. 2015).
Council filed suit against the United States
Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land
Management (collectively, the Government) under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA),
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
According to Council, the Government had not given
Council the ability to read the final bat migration
studies used in the environmental impact study of a
proposed wind energy project. The Government had
published the study for the statutorily required 30
days, and while Council commented on other sections
of the environmental impact study, it did not comment
on the bat migration report. The lower court granted
summary judgment for the Government. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of
the Government. In its decision, the Appellate Court
noted that NEPA does not require environmental
disturbance mitigation plans to be in their final form
when published to comply with NEPA procedural
requirements. The court noted that the Government

Georgia
White v. Ringgold Telephone Co., 779 S.E.2d 378 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2015).
Telephone Company petitioned to condemn property
for purposes of providing telephone and
telecommunication services while Landowner’s
lawsuit regarding Telephone Company’s alleged
breach of easement agreement was pending. The lower
court denied Landowners’ motion to dismiss and
entered a condemnation order. Landowners appealed
the condemnation order to the Georgia Court of
Appeals, which held that Telephone Company
attempted but was unable to procure the property by
contract, and condemnation of the property was
necessary. Therefore, because the trial court sits as the
finder of fact in ruling on exceptions to a special
master’s ruling, its judgment will not be disturbed if
there is any evidence in the record to sustain it.
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Citizens Group damages to pay for a new bridge as
well as additional punitive damages for Landowner’s
malicious actions.

Louisiana
Roberson v. E. W. Chance, 2015 WL 7280562, No.
50,169–CA (La. App. 2 Cir. 2015).

New Jersey
Van Horn v. Harmony Sand & Gravel, Inc., 442 N.J.
Super. 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015).

Landowners brought action against purported Lot
Owners, alleging that Lot Owners were trespassing
without the right to possession. The lower court, after
a bench trial, entered judgment finding that Lot
Owners obtained the lot by a ten-year acquisitive
prescription or adverse possession. Landowners then
appealed. The Court of Appeals held: (1) the first lot
owner was properly dismissed from the suit; (2) the
prior owners of the disputed lot, before conveying it to
Lot Owners, possessed the lot in good faith for at least
ten years, as required for ten-year acquisitive
prescription; and (3) the prior owners had just title, as
required for ten-year acquisitive prescription.

In 2014, Landowner, who had inherited land interests
a decade earlier, filed a complaint to eject Operator
from the property who had been conducting soil
excavation on the property. Operator had been
conducting excavation by a 1990 agreement (First
Agreement) originally signed by Landowner’s father.
When the First Agreement expired in 2000, the parties
executed another agreement (Second Agreement). The
Second Agreement gave Operator the option to extend
operations for an indefinite amount of time, expiring
only when Operator determined there was insufficient
aggregate material to remove. The parties stipulated
that no material facts were in dispute and moved for
summary judgment. The lower court ruled in
Operator’s favor due to the fact that, although the
Second Agreement governed no definite period of
time, the agreement expressly terminated once certain
conditions were met. On appeal, the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that the Second Agreement was not a
lease, despite what the parties called it, because it did
not give Operator exclusive possession as a leasehold
estate. Instead, the Second Agreement was a valid
profit relationship, permitting “severance of the
physical substances of a servient tenement” without
the option for Landowner to revoke absent default.

Massachusetts
DeFelice Corp. v. Department of Public Utilities, 38
N.E. 3d 1040 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015).
Contractor struck an underground natural gas line
while digging a water main, resulting in an explosion
with damage to nearby property. The Department of
Public Utilities (DPU) investigated Contractor’s
operations, concluding that Contractor failed to take
the necessary precautionary methods prior to the dig,
and fined Contractor $31,000 for violating “dig safe”
laws. Contractor appealed the administrative agency’s
fine and decision. The Appeals Court of
Massachusetts determined that it would only overrule
the discretion of the agency in extraordinary or
exceptional cases, and affirmed DPU’s administrative
fine.

South Dakota
Pesall v. Montana Dakota Utilities, Co., 871 N.W.2d
649 (S.D. 2015).
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) issued a permit to
Power Companies (Companies) that allowed
Companies to construct a high-voltage electric
transmission line designed to identify and mitigate
potential parasite problems. Individual objected and
appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed PUC’s
decision to grant the permit. Individual raised two
questions on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether
PUC improperly delegated its authority to a private
party; and (2) whether PUC exceeded a statutory time
limit for issuing complete findings. The Supreme
Court of South Dakota affirmed the Appellate Court’s
decision and held: (1) PUC did not delegate its
regulatory authority to Companies since the modified
condition and mitigation plan allowed for PUC to
verify and exercise its oversight authority over the

Montana
Public Land/Water Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Jones, 358
P.3d 899 (Mont. 2015).
Landowner prevented access to roads running across
his property, which served as easements to reach
adjacent public property. Citizens Group sued for
declaratory relief and damages. During the
proceedings, a wildfire destroyed the bridge serving as
a portion of the easement. Landowner fashioned a new
bridge using his own railcar, and argued that by
constructing a new bridge, he was therefore permitted
to prevent public access to it. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Montana held that Landowner was liable for
tortious interference of public property and awarded
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development and construction of the transmission line;
(2) PUC timely rendered complete findings on the
permit application since PUC retained future
enforcement of conditions even without listing
specific mitigation plans in the its final decision.
Texas
In re Electric Transmission Texas, LLC, 2015 WL
6759238, No. 13-15-00423-CV (Tex. App. 2015).
Electricity Transmission Company sought a writ of
mandamus, contending that the lower court acted
outside of its jurisdiction in not complying with the
eminent domain statute when it failed to appoint
special commissioners and granted a continuance to
hear Landowner’s Plea in Abatement. The Court of
Appeals noted that the period between the filing of the
statement seeking condemnation and the award by the
special commissioners is “administrative in nature.”
During this administrative phase, trial court
jurisdiction “is limited to appointing the
commissioners, receiving their opinion as to value,
and
rendering judgment
based
upon the
commissioners’ award.” In other words, the trial court
can only act within the prescribed scope of the
eminent domain statute. Because the trial court acted
outside of its statutory authority by refusing to appoint
special commissioners and granting a continuance,
such orders are void. The Court of Appeals issued a
writ of mandamus, conditioned on the lower court’s
failure to vacate its orders and appoint three special
commissioners as required by the eminent domain
statute.
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